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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a great privilege to inaugurate this Lecture in honor of Walter
Weyrauch. Professor Weyrauch's contributions to the fields of family law
and comparative law are legendary. He has blazed multiple trails in legal
scholarship, and a unifying hallmark of his work is that he approaches
every topic with imagination and an open mind, driven by a desire to
understand how the law is actually lived. Professor Weyrauch's scholarship
reminds us at every turn that the law is not to be found exclusively or even
* Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Illinois
College of Law. I am grateful to Professors Nancy Dowd and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
directors of the University ofFlorida's Center on Children and Families, for the invitation to deliver
this Weyrauch Distinguished Lecture in Family Law, and to Professor Walter Weyrauch for the
example of his work.
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predominantly in law libraries and courthouses. Whether studying the legal
traditions of the Romani people or how legal norms might govern outposts
in space, Professor Weyrauch explores the complex ways in which law is
interwoven with culture and occupies the interstices of human
relationships, always paying close and respectful attention to the facts.' It
is difficult to imagine a more useful model for the study of family law.
Among the many landmarks in his scholarship, Professor Weyrauch has
written perceptively about race discrimination in this country and about the
status of vulnerable groups more generally.2 His work in this vein is partly
the inspiration for my topic here-the role of race in decisions about the
placement of children. A second inspiration is place, because Central
Florida provided a particularly important legal landmark in this field: the
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Palmorev. Sidoti.3
Race in the placement of children has been a flashpoint for decades.
Given that the topic joins two of the most charged subjects in American
society, race and child welfare, it could hardly be otherwise. 4 From one
perspective, the child-welfare system callously ignores or discounts the
costs of state intervention borne by African American and other minority
families.' From another, race is too often thrown out as an obstacle to

1. See, e.g., GYPSY LAW: ROMANI LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CULTURE (Walter 0. Weyrauch
ed., 2001); Walter O. Weyrauch, Unwritten Constitutions, UnwrittenLaw, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1211 (1999); Walter O. Weyrauch, Oral Legal Traditions of Gypsies and Some American
Equivalents, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 407 (1997); Walter O. Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell,
Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993); Walter 0.
Weyrauch, The "BasicLaw" or "Constitution" of a Small Group, 27 J.SOC. ISSUES 49 (1971);
Walter 0. Weyrauch, The Law of a Small Group:A Report on the Berkeley PenthouseExperiments
with Emphasis on Penthouse V (Space Sciences Laboratory, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Internal
Working Paper No. 54, 1967); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law in Isolation: The PenthouseAstronauts,
TRANS-ACTION, June 1968, at 39.

2. See Walter 0. Weyrauch, The Romani People: A Long Surviving and Distinguished
Culture at Risk, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 679 (2003); Walter 0. Weyrauch, An Immigrant'sEncounter
with Race in America, 48 FLA. L. REV. 445 (1996).
3. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
4. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother? ": ConceptualizingChildren's
Identity Rights in TransracialAdoptions, 2 DUKE J.GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 120 (1995)
(observing that "[t]ransracial adoption combines some of the most potent dilemmas of modem
America...").
5. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002);

Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q.
461 (1999); Annette R. Appell, DisposableMothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J.RACE & L.
421 (2004); Cristina White, FederallyMandatedDestructionof the Black Family: The Adoption
andSafe Families Act, 1 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 303 (2006).
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doing what is best for children and for the broader society.6 Observers
often seem to agree that placement decisions are distorted by unfortunate
"racial politics," even when they fundamentally disagree about the
direction of the distortion.7
In Palmore, the Supreme Court intervened pointedly to curb reliance
on race.' Ruling in a divorce case out of Tampa, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause did not permit a state court to transfer custody of
a child based on her mother's decision to marry a man of a different race.'
Palmore's intervention, however, plainly did not end the debate over
whether race may be considered in matters of custody and adoption.'0 In
the more than two decades since Palmore,courts, legislators, caseworkers,
and adoption agencies have continued to struggle, often heatedly, to define
the appropriate role for race in the placement of children." Years after
Palmore, states continued to adhere to statutes or other legal guidelines
establishing priorities or preferences for same-race placements, sometimes
specifying the length of time children would be kept waiting while
caseworkers searched for willing adoptive parents of the child's race.' 2
Even after Congress enacted legislation in the mid-1990s effectively
extending Palmore's prohibition of race discrimination to the context of

6. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTERDRIFT,

130-40 (1999); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
FulfillingAdoptive Parents'RacialPreferencesThrough DiscriminatoryState Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 875 (1998).
7. ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 165 (asserting that racial politics undergird support for
transracial adoption); Banks, supra note 6, at 880 (noting that "race politics" underlie the debate
over children's best interests in transracial adoption); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, CulturalConflict,and
the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 984 (2003) (observing that in the controversy
over transracial adoption "the label 'racial discrimination' is deployed on both sides of the
argument").
8. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 429.
9. Id. at 433-34.
10. See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 385 (2003) (concluding that while some judges continue to limit the Court's mandate
on pretextual grounds, "Palmoredoes appear to have made a difference in the resolution of some
litigated disputes").
11. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity
and ChildPlacement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925,
930-32 (1994) (noting that Palmoreleft considerable uncertainty in the lower courts).
12. See Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural
Preservation,59 UMKC L. REV. 487,497 (1991); David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-RacialAdoption
and the Statutory PreferenceSchemes: Before the "Best Interests" and After the "Melting Pot,"
68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 137 (1994).
AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE
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foster care and adoption, observers clashed over whether federal law did
not leave some wiggle room for "reasonable" considerations of race. 3
Recently, new developments have only underscored the murkiness of
the legal landscape. Indeed, the developments seem to point in opposite
directions at once. On one hand, in the summer of 2006, an appellate court
outside Chicago became the latest to read Palmorenarrowly. 4 So long as
race is not the sole factor, the court ruled, state actors are free to take race
into account with other factors in deciding with whom a child should live.'"
Palmorehad nothing to say, the Illinois court held, about a divorce court's
decision to use race as a "tipping factor" in determining that a biracial child
would be better off with her African-American mother than with her white
father.' 6 In this view, the Constitution poses a barrier only to the most hamhanded uses of race in custody, leaving the state with broad discretion to
weigh race flexibly alongside other considerations in determining a child's
best interests.
At the same time, however, the federal government has launched a new
and aggressive campaign against race-matching in adoption.' 7 This
campaign reads Palmore broadly to condemn virtually all race-conscious
decisionmaking in the placement of children.'8 In this view, even inquiring
into a prospective adoptive parent's plans for dealing with the special
challenges of a transracial placement is said to constitute race
discrimination prohibited by federal statutes and, ultimately, the
Constitution. '

In this Lecture, I want to examine these contending understandings of
the legal constraints on considering race in matters of child welfare and
suggest that both are wrong. What both approaches share in common is a
craving for a bright-line solution: Court decisions such as the one from
Illinois would categorically open the door to free-wheeling considerations

13. See BARTHOLET, supra note 6, at 130-40 (describing the determination of many childwelfare workers to circumvent federal anti-discrimination mandates through "creative
'interpretations' of federal law); cf Solangel Maldonado, DiscouragingRacialPreferences in
Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1415, 1457 (2006) (observing that, "[u]ndoubtedly, some
agencies continue to race match, in contravention of the law...").
14. See In re Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
15. See id. at 868-69.
16. See id. at 868 (noting that trial court had "believed that [race] ... tipped the scale
slightly..." in favor of the mother).
17. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Commentary: CulturalStereotypes Can andDo Die: It's Time
to Move on with TransracialAdoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 317 (2006)
(describing the "dramatic new development.., on the enforcement front").
18. Seeid. at 317-19.
19. See id.
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of race, while the new federal enforcement policy would slam the door shut
except in the narrowest imaginable exceptions. My own view is that the
Constitution does not provide such neat solutions. Strict scrutiny, properly
understood, requires that any consideration of race must be justified by a
persuasive demonstration that it yields very substantial benefits to children.
I doubt that placement could often be denied on grounds of race under this
standard, but neither do I believe that it mandates the unyielding colorblindness contemplated by federal officials and some scholars.
A frustrating feature of this understanding is that it would leave to caseby-case determination whether race could legitimately factor in to a
placement decision. But this inefficiency is, in my view, an unavoidable
result of the need to balance the Constitution's rightful skepticism of raceconscious decisionmaking by the government against the sometimes
compelling needs of individual children.
I arrive at this conclusion in three steps. First, I describe briefly the key
landmarks that frame the debate over race and child custody, including the
Court's decision in Palmore and Congress's enactment and subsequent
amendment of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) in the mid- 1990S.20
This will be familiar ground for many, but a brief orientation is necessary
for what follows. Second, I turn to the recent judicial and administrative
rulings, and contend that they either understate (in the case of the court
opinions) or overstate (in the case of the administrative rulings) the
constitutional and statutory constraints. Finally, I will close by suggesting
what I see as the proper limits in this area.
I should emphasize the modesty of my project. I certainly do not claim
to offer a comprehensive account of the enormously complex issues raised
here, including the meaning of race, its significance to children, and the
desirability or feasibility of aspiring to a "color-blind" society. All I can
hope to accomplish in this brief space is to clear away some of the brush
in recent arguments and to identify the relevant legal standards that should
guide court decisions in this area. Given the confines of this platform, what
follows necessarily appears in broad strokes. But I hope that it may suggest
an analytical foundation upon which future arguments and empirical data
might be organized.

20. See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
§§ 551-54, 108 Stat. 3518,4056-57 (1994); Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoptions, § 1808
of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755,
1903-04 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)).
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II. HISTORY AND LANDMARKS IN THE BATTLE OVER
RACE AND CUSTODY

At the outset, it is worth recalling that laws regulating race in child
placement were once an integral feature of Jim Crow. Statutes in Louisiana
and Texas expressly prohibited adoption across racial lines. 2' And scholars
have catalogued the extraordinary lengths to which state actors sometimes
went to police the racial boundaries of family life in adoption and custody.
In his book InterracialIntimacies,Randall Kennedy, for example, recounts
the Kafkaesque story of Jacqueline Henley, a biracial child who could not
be adopted by the African American foster parents who cared for and loved
her, solely because she had been classified as "white" when she was born.22
In other jurisdictions where no such laws existed, social norms
achieved the same result. There are almost no recorded instances of formal
transracial adoptions before World War .23 The practice remained no
more than a trickle until the 1960s, when the integrationist ideals of the
Civil Rights era spurred new interest.24 The number of Black children
adopted by white parents shot up from 733 nationwide in 1968 to 2,574
just three years later.
Then, the bottom fell out. One year later, in 1972, the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) famously condemned the
adoption of Black children by white families in incendiary terms,
describing it as a "form of genocide. 26 Child welfare agencies pulled back,
27
and in two years the number of transracial adoptions had been cut in half.

21. The statutes were both held unconstitutional in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See In re
Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp.
264 (E.D. La. 1972).
22. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 3-12.
23. See id. at 387. Most accounts trace the history of transracial adoption to a 1948 case in
which white foster parents in Minnesota adopted the Black foster child in their care. See HAWLEY
FOGG-DAViS, THE ETHICS OF TRANSRACIALADOPTION 3 (2002); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial
Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudicesand DiscriminationFloat Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 409, 441 (1997).
24.

See BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 165

(2002) (recounting how "[t]he optimism of the early civil rights movement inspired some white
adopters to claim African American children as their own").
25. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE & IDENTITY: FROM INFANCY TO
YOUNG ADULTHOOD 10 tbl.1.5 (2d ed. 2002).

26. Id. at 14-15 (quoting position paper of the NABSW presented at its 1972 national
conference); see also Barriers to Adoption: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human
Res., 99th Cong., 214-18 (1 st Sess. 1985) (statement of William T. Merritt, President, Nat'l Ass'n
of Black Social Workers).
27. See SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 25, at 10 tbl.1.5.
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A parallel debate was unfolding at the same time concerning the
adoption of Native American children. Critics charged that child welfare
authorities were tearing apart tribal communities and threatening their
future by removing large numbers of Indian children and placing them into
non-Indian homes.28 Evidence in the early 1970s suggested that roughly a
third of Indian children had been removed from their families and placed
out through adoption or foster care. Overwhelmingly, these placements
were in non-Indian homes.2 9
In 1978, Congress acted to curb Indian adoptions through the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).3 ° ICWA requires deference in many cases to
tribal courts. It directs that Indian children should be placed within the
tribe, or with other Indian families whenever possible, and with nonIndians only as a last resort. 31 Many state child-welfare and adoption
agencies embraced similar rules for transracial adoptions, sometimes
requiring lengthy efforts to find a same-race placement before resorting to
adoption across racial lines.32
Butjust as race was looming ever larger as an obstacle to adoption, two
important developments pushed back in the other direction. The first was
the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Palmore. Palmore concerned
custody after divorce, not adoption, but it had potentially broader
implications. 33 Linda and Anthony Sidoti, both white, had divorced in
1980, and Linda had won custody of their three-year-old daughter,
Melanie.34 A year later, after Linda moved in with and planned to marry an
African American man, Anthony sought a change of custody and the trial
judge assented. 35 The judge explained that "there is no issue as to either
[parent's] devotion to the child ... or respectability of the new spouse,"

28. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: "The Indian Problem" and the Lost Art
of Survival, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 35, 39-40 n.25 (2003-2004).
29. See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African American
Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 201, 202 (1997-1998); SIMON &
ALTSTEIN, supra note 25, at 18.
30. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
31. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). See also 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1915; Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Underthe Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 605-23 (2002) (describing
ICWA's key features and operation).
32. See Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1189-96; Joan Heifetz Hollinger, A Guide to the
Multiethnic PlacementAct of 1994 as Amended by the InterethnicAdoption Provisions of 1996,
ch. I(C) (ABA Center on Child. & Law 1998), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/
pubs/mepa94/mepachpl .htm (last visited June 4, 2007).
33. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
34. Id. at 430.
35. Id.
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and insisted that "[t]he father's evident resentment of the mother's choice
of a black partner [was itself] not sufficient to wrest custody from the
mother."36 But the judge reasoned that it would be in Melanie's "best
interests" to avoid the "peer pressures" and "social stigmatization" sure to
be visited upon an interracial household."
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
held that the trial court's custody order in Palmore violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Because the state court's custody decision turned on a
racial classification, it triggered the "most exacting scrutiny," requiring
proof that the classification was necessary to the achievement of a
compelling state interest.3" Burger's opinion allowed that protecting a
young child's welfare was a state "duty of the highest order," but then
failed to follow up by asking whether the change of custody was in fact
necessary, or narrowly tailored, to protect Melanie's welfare.39 Instead, the
Court's opinion turned on a dime, effectively implying that the inquiry was
beside the point: "[W]hatever problems racially mixed households may
pose for children," the Court ruled, cannot sustain state action premised on
racial prejudice4":
The question.., is whether the reality of private biases and the
possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother.... [T]hey are not.... Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect. 4
Palmoredealt only with a parental custody dispute. But its willingness
to subject race-conscious custody decisions to strict scrutiny-and its
condemnation of state efforts to shield children from racial prejudice by
removing them from otherwise proper placements--cast a shadow over
state preferences for same-race adoption as well. Any doubt on this score
was removed by the enactment of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA)
in 1994. Even before MEPA, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had

36. See id.at 430-31.
37. Id.at 431.
38. Palmore,466 U.S. at 432.
39. Id.at 433.
40. Id. at 434; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, ComparingRace and Sex Discriminationin
Custody Cases, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 877, 881 (2000) (observing that Palmore"concluded almost
categorically that the harm of considering race in a custody case is greater than the possible gains").
41. Palmore,466 U.S. at 433.
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'
broadly prohibited race discrimination in "any program or activity"42
receiving federal funds-a statutory prohibition understood to be
coextensive with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.43 MEPA
was meant to give more specific content to this general guarantee by
clarifying that any recipient of federal funds in the fields of foster care or
adoption may not "delay or deny the placement of a child" on grounds of
44
race.
The original version of MEPA, passed in 1994, prohibited "delay[ing]
or deny[ing] the placement" or "categorically deny[ing]" the chance to be
a foster or adoptive parent "solely on the basis of... race."4' 5 The Act also
expressly allowed agencies to "consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial
background of the child and the capacity of the prospective
foster ... parents to meet the needs of a child."4' 6 The Act was significantly
amended in 1996, stiffening the prohibition by dropping qualifying terms
such as "categorically" and "solely," as well as the express allowance for
evaluating race and cultural competence of prospective parents. As
amended, the Act now prohibits, without qualification, "delay[ing] or
deny[ing] the placement of a child . . . on the basis of race, color, or
national origin. ' 47
MEPA thus opened doors to transracial adoption that had been at least
partly closed since the 1970s. 48 MEPA's timing also coincided with the
enactment of another important federal statute, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). 49 ASFA aimed to quicken the pace of
adoptions generally by limiting states' obligations under pre-existing
federal law to attempt family reunification before terminating the rights of
abusive or neglectful parents.5"

42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
43. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); General Building Contractors Ass'n
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-91 (1982).
44. See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
§ 553(a)(1), 108 Stat. 3518, 4056 (1994).
45. Id. § 553(a)(2).
46. Id. For discussion of MEPA's original enactment and its subsequent amendment, see
BARTHOLET, supra note 6, at 130-33; Hollinger, supranote 32.
47. Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoptions, § 1808 of the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 32.
49. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
50. See Richard P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the Adoption
and Safe FamiliesAct, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 371, 372-76 (2005). For opposing views of
ASFA's impact on children, compare BARTHOLET, supra note 6, at 188-89 (generally approving
ASFA), with MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 174-212 (2005),
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The combined effect of MEPA and ASFA has been significant. The
number of adoptions overall has more than doubled since ASFA took
effect, and in some states, it has tripled." Furthermore, a greater share of
these adoptions cross racial lines: in 1998, fourteen percent of Black
children adopted from foster care were adopted by a family of a different
race; in 2004, the number had climbed to twenty-six percent. 2 While
resistance to transracial adoption has declined, it is clear that many childwelfare professionals continue to believe, as a federal Interagency Task
Force on Adoption stated in 1988, that "[a]ll things being equal, it is
preferable to place a child in a family of his own racial background."53
What is far less clear, especially after the amendments tightening MEPA,
is whether it is legal for adoption workers to act on that belief.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS-DIVERGING PATHS ON THE
RELEVANCE OF RACE

Two recent developments highlight the range of opinion on the
permissibility of considering race in making placement decisions for
children. One suggests a broad allowance for race-matching, while the
other suggests almost none. There is reason to think that neither is quite
right.
A. BarringConsiderationof Race Only as the "Sole " Basisfor a
Custody Decision: In re Marriage of Gambla
The Illinois case, In re Marriageof Gambla,54 involved the divorce of
an interracial couple. Both the husband, Christopher (who was white), and
the wife, Kimberly (who was African American), sought sole custody of
their only child, three-year-old Kira. Both of the experts in the case who

and Martin Guggenheim, Ratify the U.N. Conventionon the Rights of the Child,But Don't Expect
Any Miracles, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 43, 61 (2006) (contending that ASFA reflects "America's
penchant for destroying families in the name of advancing children's rights").
51. See Jess M. McDonald et al., Nation's Child Welfare System Doubles Number of
Adoptionsfrom FosterCare,at 1 (Univ. of Illinois Sch. of Soc. Work, Child. & Fam. Res. Ctr. Oct.
2003), available at http://www.fosteringresults/results/reports/pewreports_10-1-03_
doubledadoptions.pdf; Barth et al., supra note 50, at 385-88 (analyzing increase in adoption rate
from foster care since ASFA's enactment).
52. See Lynette Clemetson & Ron Nixon, Breaking Through Adoption's Racial Barriers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at Al.
53. Interagency Task Force on Adoption, America's Waiting Children: A Report to the
President from the Interagency Task Force on Adoption (1988).
54. 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ili. App. Ct. 2006).
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had been qualified to offer opinions about Kira's best interests concluded
that she would be better off with her father.55 They based this judgment
partly on observations of the parties' interactions, the mother's
idiosyncratic views about conventional medical care, and some history of
the mother obstructing the father's access to Kira. The trial court
discounted the experts, however, and found both parents to be perfectly
equal with respect to each "best interests" factor. 6 The deadlock was
finally broken by considering race:
The trial court noted that Kira would have to learn to exist as a
biracial woman in a society that is sometimes hostile to such
individuals and that Kimberly would be better able to provide for
Kira's emotional needs in this respect. The trial court believed that
this factor tipped the scale slightly in Kimberly's
favor, and it
7
awarded Kimberly sole custody of Kira.1
Reviewing this decision, the Illinois Appellate Court found that this
approach comported both with state law and the constitutional dictates of
Palmore. The state court reasoned that, in Palmore, "the custody award
was unconstitutional, not because the trial court considered race, but
because the trial court considered solely race.""8 The court concluded that
"so long as race is not the sole consideration for custody decisions, but
only one of several factors, it is not an unconstitutional consideration."59
The court noted that this view was supported by "[v]olumes of cases from
other jurisdictions" interpreting Palmore in the same way.6 ° Under this
reading of Palmore,the Illinois trial court's use of race was unproblematic
because race was certainly not the only factor considered, it was just the
only distinguishing factor.
This understanding of Palmore is almost certainly incorrect. As an
initial matter, it is simply wrong to say that the Palmore trial court had
considered only race. To the contrary, the court in Tampa had considered
a series of allegations by the father about the mother's neglectful
55. Id.at 861-62, 870.
56. Id. at 861-62, 866-68.
57. Id. at 868. The trial court's decision to match a biracial child with her African American
mother rather than with her white father has precedent in a series of earlier divorce custody cases.
See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 11, at 935-36 (reviewing cases); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child
Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost ofDiscretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-1991).
58. In re Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 869 (emphasis in original).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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caregiving,6' but implicitly rejected these claims, finding "no issue as to
either party's devotion to the child."62 The court then went on, as did the
trial court in Gambla, to consider race, a consideration that ultimately
carried the day. In neither case, then, was race the "sole consideration"
relevant to custody.
Nor, in any event, is there much analytic substance to the distinction
between using race as a "sole" factor and using it to "tip scales" that would
otherwise be balanced differently. The distinction recalls the debate in the
Supreme Court's affirmative action cases over the relative weight to be
assigned to race in admissions decisions. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,6 3 Justice Powell valorized the use of race as a soft
"plus" factor in a broader mix of diversity considerations, contrasting the
overly rigid way in which the University of California-Davis medical
program made race effectively the sole qualifying characteristic for its setaside seats.' 4 More recently, in the University of Michigan cases, the Court
disparaged the undergraduate admissions program for rigidly quantifying
the comparatively higher value it assigned to race as compared to other
diversity factors.65 It is important to remember, however, that the Court's
evaluation was relevant to its determination of whether the racial
classifications could be considered "narrowly tailored" to the compelling
goal of diversity. By contrast, Gambla and similar cases have instead
looked to the relative weighting of race to decide whether the classification
should be subject to strict scrutiny in the first place.
Other courts have tried slightly different gambits to cabin or sidestep
entirely the application of equal protection principles to race-based childplacement decisions. In an en banc decision in 1977, the former Fifth
Circuit reasoned that race-matching should not be considered a suspect
racial classification because race was considered only in "a
nondiscriminatory fashion., 66 "Impact alone does not sustain a claim of
racial discrimination," the court noted.67 Rather, intent to discriminate must
also be shown, and "[t]here has been no suggestion.., that the defendants

61. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 472 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. App. Ct. 1985) (among others, Melanie
had suffered from head lice and poor hygiene); KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 380-81.
62. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430 (1984) (quoting trial court's opinion).
63. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. Id.at 317-18.
65. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246-47 (2003).
66. Drummond v. Fulton Co. Dep't of Fam. & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc).For an eloquent discussion of Drummond and its aftermath, see Carl E. Schneider,
Strangers and Brothers: A Homily on TransracialAdoption, 2 WHITTLER J. CHID & FAM.
ADVOCACY 1 (2003).
67. Id. at 1205.
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had any purposes other than to act in the best interests of the child when it
considered race."6 This reasoning, however, conflates motivation and
intent. The Supreme Court has now clearly held that all classifications
intentionally drawn on the basis of race are subject to strict scrutiny, even
if the motivations behind the classification are benign.69
The former Fifth Circuit also sustained consideration of race in
adoption by fitting it within broader policies to match adoptive parents and
children according to all physical features, including eye color, hair color,
facial features, and so on, on the "belief that a child and adoptive parents
can best adjust to a normal family relationship if the child"7° can pass as a
genetic offspring. The court freely allowed that it did "not have the
professional expertise to assess the wisdom of that type of inquiry," but
deferred because the supposed benefit is plausible. 7'
Here again, the court's reasoning begged the question. The court's
deference would be appropriate if only the rational-basis test applied; but
strict scrutiny cannot be avoided simply by packaging race alongside nonsuspect classifications. Under strict scrutiny, a court must be convinced of
the "wisdom" and demonstrated necessity of using suspect classifications;
plausible conjecture is not enough.72
Contrary to the artifices found in these cases, both old and new, all
race-conscious government decisionmaking must be subjected to strict
scrutiny. There is no basis for placing race-based decisions in the context
of adoption and custody as somehow outside the scope of heightened
constitutional review.
B. The Move Toward Color-Blindnessin FederalEnforcement Policy
While Gambla has sought to narrow Palmore almost to its facts,
officials in the federal government lately have been seeking to push
Palmoreto its outer limits. Writing in 2003, Randall Kennedy forecast dim
prospects for aggressive enforcement of federal civil rights law against
adoption agencies. He observed that the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the agency charged with enforcing MEPA and
related laws against race discrimination, was dominated by "wellentrenched officials ...[who] were opposed to the law in the first place"

68.
69.
515 U.S.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499,505 (2005); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
200, 226-27 (1995).
Drummond,563 F.2d at 1205-06.
Id.at 1206.
See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509-15.
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and were unlikely to take any "aggressive steps" to enforce it.73 Yet, even
while Professor Kennedy's book was probably at press, officials in the
HHS Office for Civil Rights were preparing a 60-page letter finding
Hamilton County, Ohio, and the State of Ohio in violation of title VI and
MEPA.74 Although the agency had launched more than 130 investigations
over the previous 5 years, this was the first time it had issued a formal
letter finding a violation.
The enforcement letter marks an important turning point in the federal
government's understanding ofthe legal strictures on race-matching.75 The
letter ruling, based on an investigation into adoptions in the Cincinnati area
spanning more than four years, catalogued a series of illegal practices, both
in agency policies and in individual adoptive placements. It began with the
case of two-year-old Leah Hahn (a pseudonym assigned by HHS).76 Leah,
who is African American, had been born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and
a form of dwarfism. After she had been in the permanent custody of the
county for about six months, a married couple, the Atkinsons, inquired
about the possibility of adopting her.
The Atkinsons appeared in many respects to be an ideal placement.
They had three biological children, each of whom had significant special
health needs, and they were longtime foster parents to a fourth child, an
Alaskan Native who, like Leah, had a form of dwarfism as well as other
special needs. The Atkinsons learned about Leah from Little People of
America, a national advocacy group in which the Atkinsons were active.
There was, however, a potential catch: The Atkinsons were white and lived
in North Pole, Alaska, a suburb of Fairbanks."
Caseworkers in Cincinnati responded cautiously to the Atkinsons'
expression of interest. They wanted to know how many African Americans
lived in Alaska and in the area where the Atkinsons lived. They asked
about the racial composition of the Atkinsons' church and school system.
Finally, some caseworkers were concerned about the Atkinsons' stated

73. KENNEDY, supranote 10, at 433. Bartholet, writing in 1999, similarly observed that HHS
"has been awfully quiet" and found no "evidence of the kind of enforcement activity that would
make significant change in the near future seem likely." BARTHOLET, supranote 6, at 133; see also
Schneider, supranote 66, at 4 & n. 16 (discussing the HHS's failure to enforce MEPA vigorously).
74. Letter of Findings, from Lisa M. Simeone, Regional Manager of the Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., to Suzanne A. Burke, Director of the Hamilton Cty.
Dep't of Hum. Servs., & Tom Hayes, Director of the Ohio Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs. (Oct. 20,
2003) [hereinafter Ohio Letter ofFindings], availableat www.hhs.gov/ocr/mepa/hamilton-co2.pdf.
75. See Bartholet, supranote 17, at 317.
76. Ohio Letter of Findings, supra note 74, at 15.
77. Id.
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intention to raise Leah in "a color-blind manner"; one caseworker
78
expressed the view that "there [is] no such thing as 'color blind."'
The agency decided to wait on consideration of the Atkinsons'
application to see if alternative placements might be found. 79 After several
months, the agency matched Leah with an African American woman in
Columbus, Ohio, who ultimately decided that she did not want to adopt a
child with dwarfism. 8 Thereafter, Leah was adopted by a white woman in
Cleveland.8' Although the new mother was white, HHS found that race still
drove the agency's decision. 2 It noted that "this placement was looked
upon favorably by [the county agency] because [the woman's]
neighborhood was integrated, and some of her family members were
biracial."83
HHS held that this consideration of race violated title VI, 84 the statutory
ban on race discrimination that parallels the U.S. Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection.8 ' The agency had both delayed and ultimately denied
the Atkinsons' application on grounds of race. 6 HHS did not base its
finding only on the county's decision to defer its decision on the
Atkinsons. It also held that the agency had no business inquiring about the
racial diversity of the Atkinsons' community and social circles, or their
plans for addressing Leah's racial identity. 7 As HHS saw it, the county's
selective inquiry into community diversity and plans for addressing a
child's racial heritage only in cases of transracial adoption showed that
"different standards" applied depending on the race of the applicants. Such
discrimination, HHS ruled, could not be justified by "generalized
assumptions and stereotypes of parents based on their race"--such as that
African American parents are specially able to guide African American
children in coping with racial prejudice.88 Instead, under strict scrutiny, any
78. Id.at 16.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 17.
81. Ohio Letter of Findings, supra note 74, at 18.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
85. Ohio Letter of Findings, supra note 74, at 18-19.
86. Id.
87. See id.at 54, 58.
88. Id. at 55-56. HHS found that agency had repeated its violation of title VI when it made
similar inquiries of other white prospective adoptive parents, including Chad and Ruth Lamm of
rural Easton, Illinois stating:
HCDHS employed race-based criteria in evaluating the Lamms as prospective
adoptive parents for Leah. HCDHS sought out information about how much
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inquiry relating to race must be supported by exceptional facts suggesting
that a particular child has a peculiar and compelling need for a same-race
placement.89 Under this approach, for instance, it might be permissible to
consider race in placing an older teenager who was adamant in resisting
placement with white parents; but broader assumptions about the benefits
to children of interacting with adults who share the child's racial
background are impermissible.9"
In a separate Penalty Letter, HHS ultimately fined Ohio $1.8 million for
its repeated transgressions.91 In practical terms, the amount of this penalty
may be as significant as the legal reasoning that underlies it. As Elizabeth
Bartholet rightly points out, HHS's willingness to impose-for the first
time-such a severe financial penalty "raises the stakes in a way that
agency directors and agency workers will not be able to ignore."92
HHS underscored its newly aggressive commitment to prohibiting racematching in a second enforcement action against South Carolina in 2005.93
As in the Ohio enforcement action, the Department found that the State's
routine practice of subjecting "families who were willing to adopt
transracially... to an extra layer of scrutiny to assess their ability to adopt
transracially" violated both MEPA and title VI. 94 HHS opined that
"assessing the race and ethnicity of the parents' friends, the race and
ethnicity of the members of the parents' church, the race and ethnicity of
the parents' neighbors, and the racial and ethnic make-up of nearby
schools," and generally "forc[ing] the prospective parent to defend their
ability to nurture a child of a different race or ethnicity," was illegal. 95 So,
too, was asking prospective transracial adoptive parents whether their

contact the Lamms had with the African American community and whether there
were African American teachers or students in the local school system... HCDHS
based its need for race-based inquiries solely on the fact that Leah was of a
different race than the Lamms.
Id. at 20.
89. BARTHOLET, supra note 6, at 132.
90. See id at 132-33 (quoting HHS "Guidance" Memorandum dated June 5, 1997).
91. Penalty Letter from Wade F. Horn, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, HHS,
to Tom Hayes, Director of the Ohio Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs. (Oct. 20, 2003), available at
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/mepa.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
92. Bartholet, supra note 17, at 319.
93. Letter of Findings from Roosevelt Freeman, Regional Manager of HHS Office for Civil
Rights, to Kim S. Aydlette, Director of the South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs. (Oct. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter South Carolina Letter of Findings], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/mepa/
LOFFINALOct3105.pdf.
94. Id.at 22.
95. Id.
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extended families would welcome a child of a different race or whether
their neighbors would react with hostility.96 In short, "[a]n evaluation
system which assesses a parent's ability to adopt transracially evaluates
applicants differently on the basis ofrace, color or national origin, and thus
violates Title VI."97 The Department fined South Carolina $107,481.98
IV. TOWARD

A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCRUTINY REQUIRED OF
RACE-CONSCIOUS CUSTODY DECISIONS

HHS's rigid view of the legal strictures on race in child placement
could not be more different from the almost-anything-goes attitude
exemplified by the Illinois court's decision in Gambla. Whereas Gambla
was prepared to validate almost any use of race as a factor in placement
decisions, so long as it was not exclusive, HHS would permit almost none.
Indeed, even assuming that transracial placements raise unique childwelfare issues appears to skirt the law, in the agency's view. HHS's
hostility to race-matching is certainly more in keeping with the tenor of
MEPA's evolution toward color-blindness in adoption and foster care, but
in some respects may go too far. The Department is right to subject racebased decisions to strict scrutiny. Title VI, after all, follows constitutional
standards in scrutinizing race discrimination, and MEPA ties its standards
to title VI. But there is reason to doubt that strict scrutiny so tightly limits
government inquiry into race.
In one important respect, HHS's view of strict scrutiny is actually too
loose. The Department-like the courts in Gambla99 and similar cases, and
like a good deal of the scholarship in this area-assumes that states have
a "compelling interest" in ensuring the "best interests" of affected
children.' The Supreme Court came close to stating the same view in
Palmore,although it stopped just short: it described the "best interests" of
children as a "substantial" government objective before going on to
96. See id. at 24.
97. Id. at 23. In addition, HHS also found that South Carolina violated MEPA and title VI
by going out of its way to accommodate the racial preferences of birth mothers in placing children
and using race as a "'tie-breaking' factor among families otherwise equally appropriate for a child."
Id.at 20, 26-27.
98. Penalty Letter from Wade F. Horn, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, HHS,
to Kim Aydlette, Director of South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., at 3 (Feb. 24, 2006), available
at www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/mepaSCsignedpenaltyletter.pdf.
99. See supra text accompanying note 54.
100. See, e.g., Ohio Letter of Findings, supra note 74, at 11 ("The only compelling
governmental interest for race-based decisionmaking in the context of adoption and foster care
placements is protecting the 'best interests' of the child who is to be placed.").

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

undercut that proposition by holding that "whatever" the impact on
children, their custody may not be reassigned out of concerns for racial
prejudice.'
The difficulty with classifying a child's "best interests" as a compelling
state interest, besides the fact that Supreme Court precedent seems to refute
the idea, 0 2 is that the concept is simply too amorphous.01 3 It could mean
anything from shielding a child from life-threatening harm to simply giving
a child a tiny, marginal advantage over available alternatives. To
legitimately qualify as "compelling," any potential gain for children must
be quantified as significant, not merely extant.'04
Because ofthe slipperiness of the "best interests" standard, some judges
and scholars have concluded that the only child-welfare interest substantial
05
enough to rank as "compelling" is preventing serious harm to a child.
But this may well be too narrow. Given the state's basic trust obligation to
children and the way in which the state's own future is tied to the wellbeing and healthy development of the next generation, it seems plausible
to understand the state's "compelling" interests as extending beyond
merely sparing a child from injury to ensuring that children have the
opportunity to flourish. This conclusion would be consistent with the
decision in Troxel v. Granville, 6 which left the door open to state
intervention to preserve children's important relationships with non101. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984). As Margaret Brinig points out, it is of
course possible that the trial court's concern with the child's "best interests" was pretextual and
intended to "provide cover for a more sinister agenda." Margaret F. Brinig, The Child's Best
Interests: A Neglected Perspective on InterracialIntimacies, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2129, 2147
(2004).
102. Palmoreitself seems inconsistent with genuine recognition of a child's best interests as
a compelling public interest, since the trial court's undisturbed "best interests" finding was
insufficient to sustain its custody order. In addition, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993),
DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391
(1979), each subordinate claims concerning the "best interests" of children to other constitutional
values, suggesting that the asserted interest is something less than truly "compelling."
103. Cf Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family,ReligiousEducation, and
Harm to Children, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 114 (2000); cf Perry, supra note 57, at 56-57
(contending that "in the child placement decisionmaking where racial differences are present, the
touchstone rule of custody-the best interests rule-does little to assist in analyzing or resolving
the difficult issues often presented").
104. See David D. Meyer, The ConstitutionalRights ofNon-CustodialParents,34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1461, 1489-90 (2006).
105. See Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward
Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 279,
331 (2000); Garnett, supra note 103, at 114; In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-29 (Wash.
1998), affdon other grounds, sub. nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
106. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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parents even in the absence of proof that they would otherwise be
harmed.10 7 If this is correct, then race-based decisionmaking in this context
is permissible only if it can be demonstrated that taking race into account
is needed to substantially benefit children.
Framing the legal question in this way has several implications. First,
race may not be considered where it yields only marginal gains for child
welfare. Under this view, the Illinois court was plainly wrong in Gambla
to rely on race where it found that this consideration tipped the scales only
"ever so slightly" in favor of the mother.0 8 Benefits so small cannotjustify
the very real costs of entrenching race-conscious decisionmaking by the
government. The U.S. Supreme Court has long emphasized that racial
classifications are costly for society because they "delay the time when race
will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor."' 0 9 In the
context of custody decisions, they arguably impose distinctive costs as well
on individual family members, erecting barriers between parents and
children and effectively validating for children "racial designations which
stem, at least in part, from a rigid historical system of racial
identification.""' Particularly given these costs, it is indeed difficult, as
Twila Perry has written, to imagine a sufficiently strong justification for
considering race in custody disputes between a child's parents."' In such
cases, both parents presumably already have established a loving bond with
their child motivating them to be sensitive to their child's needs, and both
have demonstrated a willingness to overcome racial boundaries in their
own relationship. Under these circumstances, resorting to general
considerations of race in deciding custody seems quite unlikely to yield
substantial benefits to the child.

107. For an extended analysis of the opinions in Troxel, see David D. Meyer, Lochner
Redeemed: FamilyPrivacyAfter Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1125 (2001).
108. In re Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E. 2d 847, 871 (I11.
App. Ct. 2006).
109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Johnson v. California, 543
U.S.499, 507 (2005) (discussing the harm that comes from government policies that "perpetuat[e]
the notion that race matters most").
110. Perry, supra note 57, at 69. For additional discussion of the costs to children, see
Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatismin the Family: More on the TransracialAdoption Debate,
2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99, 100 (1995) (observing that barriers to transracial adoption
"separate children and prospective parents into racial categories, assign children to racially-matched
parents, and hold children for whom there is no racial match available..."); Bartholet, supranote
11, at 1223-26 (reviewing "the evidence as to costs for children of current inrace placement
preferences"); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 11, at 936-43 (describing "the psychological costs to
individual Black children when courts and agencies practice racial matching.").
111. See Perry, supra note 57, at 126-27.
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Second, given the available empirical evidence about child well-being
in transracial adoptions, it is highly doubtful that a broad use of race to
decide custody issues could be sustained. Studies overwhelmingly show
that children do very well raised in multiracial families." 2 Indeed,
researchers have found that transracial placements are as stable and deeply
attached as same-race placements, and that "transracial adoptees do as well
on measures of psychological and social adjustment as black children
raised inracially in relatively similar socio-economic circumstances.""' 3
Interview data with adult transracial adoptees generally offer the same
positive assessment." 4 Therefore, it will generally be difficult to
demonstrate a "substantial benefit" to children from a same-race
placement, particularly if the alternative would require a significantly
longer wait in temporary foster or institutional care." 5
Yet, there are surely some individual cases where children might
benefit substantially from taking race into account. Suppose, for example,
that a transracial placement would place an African American child into an
isolated, all-white community intensely hostile to African Americans, and
that the white adoptive parents had given no serious thought to dealing
with this dilemma. Without doubt, it could be shown that placing the child
in a less hostile environment would substantially benefit her. Researchers
studying child welfare in transracial placements have found that "[i]n
particular, a community's racial dynamics can affect transracially adopted
children's adjustment," and that "[t]hose making transracial placement
decisions should thus consider community- and neighborhood-level
influences."" 6
Yet, here is where I think Palmore and the HHS interpretation go
wrong. Palmore suggests that "whatever" the harm to children, a custody
decision cannot "give effect" to prejudice." 7 For its part, HHS contends
that even to inquire about the racial diversity and potential hostility of a
transracial placement imposes "different standards." But without inquiring,

112. See RITA J. SIMON & RHONDA M.

ROORDA, IN THEIR OWN VOICES: TRANSRACIAL

ADOPTEES TELL THEIR STORIES 13-25 (2000); SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 25; Arnold R.
Silverman, Outcomes ofTransracialAdoption,3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 104, 117 (1993); Kathleen
L. Whitten, PermanentFamiliesfor African-American FosterChildrenin an Imperfect World, 12
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 490, 495-97 (2005). But cf. Margaret F. Brinig, Promoting Children's
Interests Through a Responsible Research Agenda, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 149-51
(2003) (noting limitations in available studies).
113. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1255.
114. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 468-78; SIMON & ROORDA, supra note 112.
115. See Schneider, supra note 66, at 9.
116. Whitten, supranote 112, at 497.
117. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984).

PALMORE COMES OFAGE: THE PLACE OF RACE IN THE PL4CEMENT OF CHILDREN

2007]

203

it is impossible to know if the child would substantially benefit from a
different placement.
HHS faults Ohio for failing to subject same-race adoptive placements
to the same scrutiny. A presumption that Black parents have special
competence to help children grapple with the cruelties of racial prejudice,
HHS argues, is nothing more than a stereotype. Yet, the Supreme Court has
arguably challenged that notion. In Grutterv. Bollinger,'18 the 2003 case
upholding the use of race-based affirmative action at the University of
Michigan Law School, the Court held that racial diversity in the classroom
is a compelling state interest. The Court accepted that race alone is
sufficient to mark the experience of "being a racial minority in a society in
which race unfortunately still matters."" 9 The contexts are obviously
different, but the core proposition carries over: in our society, being a racial
minority provides distinctive experience that yields insight into navigating
prejudice. 20 It is an insight that cannot be as routinely attributed to whites.
Sharon Rush has made the same point effectively in her personal account
of raising her daughter in a transracial family, documenting how her
experience transformed her own understanding of race and racial
prejudice. 121
The Supreme Court thus found that there is a compelling educational
benefit from being exposed to classmates of different races in a law school
or college classroom, because the contributions of minority-race students
will inevitably be informed by the distinctive experience of living in a
society in which "race . . .matters." If we accept that proposition, it

requires only a small leap to imagine a similar benefit to children from
being exposed to caregivers and playmates of diverse racial backgrounds,
and to accept that minority-race caregivers will have a distinctive base of
experience to draw upon in addressing issues of racial prejudice. This is
not to suggest, of course, that the advantage of this experience is enormous
or all-important, nor that considerations of race should predominate. As
Hawley Fogg-Davis has written:

118. 539U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
119. Id. at333.
120. See Tanya Washington, Loving Grutter:Recognizing Race in TransracialAdoptions, 16
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2005). Hawley Fogg-Davis has written perceptively about

the complex process of "racial navigation," in which "individuals ...challenge existing racial
meanings in a lifelong process of self-reflection and -revision." FOGG-DAVIS, supra note 23, at 2.
121.

See SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A WHITE ADOPTIVE MOTHER

LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2000). Rush writes, for instance, "[a]s I write this book and look back over
the years. . . , my understanding of the complexities ofrace make me realize how limited my views
were when my daughter was a baby." Id. at 23.
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Race matters, but we need to be careful in thinking about how it
ought to matter. Racial expectations weigh heavily on our minds
and bodies, but we should not think of these expectations as
overpowering our capacity to respond to racial ascription in active
ways that foster multifaceted self-concepts.122
Yet the new HHS enforcement policy considers the racial diversity of the
neighborhoods, schools, and churches of prospective adoptive parents
essentially irrelevant and wholly out of bounds.
In my view, the U.S. Constitution permits states to inquire specifically
into the racial diversity and "hospitality" oftransracial child placements for
the same reason it permits colleges and universities to consider race in
student admissions: because we live in a society in which "race
unfortunately still matters." But the government should be permitted to act
upon the information it gathers-to delay or deny a transracial
placement--only where the child would provably benefit very
substantially.
This approach contemplates that the permissible use of race will be
determined case by case, after reasonable inquiry into the home life offered
by a prospective parent. Race would then be permitted to guide placement
decisions only when it could be shown that particular facts relating to a
prospective adoptive home, or to a child's developmental needs,
established a very strong benefit from same-race placement. Under this
approach, it might well be lawful for an agency to prefer a same-race
placement of a minority-race child over placement in an isolated, all-white
community with white parents who have no sensitivity to the ongoing
reality of racial prejudice in contemporary society. Any such judgment
must take into account far more than just race, of course. If the parents in
the transracial placement were uniquely equipped to meet the child's
special health needs, for example, or if superior placements elsewhere were
not readily available, so that alternatives would mean continued
impermanence in the child's upbringing, the comparative significance of
race would quickly fade. But if, all things considered, evidence established
that placing a child in a same-race household would substantially benefit
the child, the Constitution should not be understood to stand in the way.
For many, the indeterminacy of requiring judicial assessments of the
substantiality of claimed benefits for children will be deeply unsatisfying.
Some will object, not unreasonably, that case-by-case balancing will make
it easier for caseworkers who categorically oppose transracial adoption to
122.

FOGG-DAVIS, supra note 23, at 113.
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manipulate outcomes, injecting race even where the facts do not prove its
substantial importance. 123 Others from a different perspective will object
that it compromises the well-being of children by not making their "best
interests" the polestar of all placement decisions. And still others will
object that the failure to erect a bright-line bar on race discrimination
undermines the principle of equality.
Yet, I see no good alternative in a context in which important
constitutional values conflict. Palmoreitself, as Barbara Woodhouse has
pointed out, rested on a categorical intuition: that taking account of race
and prejudice perpetuates racial division.124 Yet what is unsatisfying about
Palmore-andwhat has left the door open to such confusion in the decades
since-is its failure to come to grips with the balancing that is inevitably
required in this setting. Palmore acknowledged that children have their
own powerful interests at stake in this dilemma, and then promptly set
them aside in the cause of eradicating racial prejudice. It is messy and can
be misused, but finding some balance point between the intersecting
interests of society and children with regard to race and custody seems to
me unavoidable given the flaws of contemporary society, in which "race
unfortunately still matters."

V. CONCLUSION

More than three decades after Palmorev. Sidoti, the nature of the legal
constraints on considerations of race in public decisions about children
remains contested and unsettled. We are, however, making progress toward
a consensus. In part because ofCongress's intervention through MEPA and
the Interethnic Adoption amendments of 1996, and newly aggressive
enforcement of federal law, longstanding barriers to transracial adoption
are falling away.
Palmoreand related changes in federal constitutional and statutory law
have not worked a revolution in family composition; indeed, social
preferences for intraracial intimacy remain strikingly durable decades after

123. Randall Kennedy, for example, argues that "pragmatic considerations counsel in favor
of the institution and enforcement of a strict antidiscrimination norm in adoption," because
"[n]othing less will break the deeply entrenched habit of race matching that remains rife throughout
this country." KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 417-18; accord BARTHOLET, supra note 6, at 130
(warning that "any leeway given to utilize race would be used to evade [the antidiscrimination
mandate]").
124. Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 124.
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the removal of legal obstacles.'25 Yet, there are signs of change here as
well. The numbers of transracial adoptions are growing both domestically
and internationally; the share of African American children adopted from
foster care by parents of a different race nearly doubled between 1998 and
2004,126 and in 2006, Ethiopia became the fifth largest country of origin for
children adopted internationally in the United States (up from 16th in
2000).127 And, importantly, studies of families who have bridged racial
continue to be generally reassuring about the
lines in parenting
28
outcomes. 1
Yet, as the Illinois court's recent decision in Gambla reflects, many
observers continue to believe that race remains a relevant and often
important factor in determining the custodial and familial associations of
children. The Illinois court, like others before it, resolved the tension by
allowing for race to be freely considered in placing children, so long as
race is not given overtly dominant weight. 129 That is progress, to be
sure-it removes at least the most heavy-handed categorical uses of race
as a qualifying characteristic for parenthood-but it plainly leaves the door
open for wide reliance on racial preferences and stereotypes that are wholly
unsupported and unsupportable.
In stark contrast, the aggressive posture recently taken by HHS in
interpreting federal law effectively pushes race entirely from the field of
relevant considerations. Its hostility to considerations of race is so strong
that it would forbid not only preferences for same-race placements, but
even inquiring into the preparedness of transracial adopters to protect their
children against racial prejudice.'30
I have suggested that the strict scrutiny required by the Constitution for
racial classifications-the standard that drives HHS's interpretation of the
federal statutory prohibitions of race discrimination in child
placements---does not compel the degree of color-blindness suggested by
the HHS's recent enforcement actions. Strict scrutiny would not permit
routine reliance on race as a factor in placement decisions, but leaves room

125.

See RACHELMORAN, INTERRACIALINTMACY 99-101 (2001); Banks, supra note 6, at 887-

88; Bartholet, supranote 11, at 1204-06; Joanna L. Grossman & John DeWitt Gregory, The Legacy
of Loving, 51 How. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
126. See supra note 52 & accompanying text.
127. See Jane Gross & Will Connors, Surge in Adoptions Raises Concerns in Ethiopia,N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2007.
128. See supranotes 112-14 & accompanying text. But cf Brinig, supranote 101, at 2150-59
(presenting empirical data suggesting some additional risks for children raised by interracial
couples).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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for reliance where considerations of race are demonstrably necessary to
achieving substantial gains in the welfare of an affected child. The
available social science does not suggest that children are commonly
harmed by transracial placements; indeed, in certain respects they appear
to enjoy distinct benefits. Yet, studies also suggest that the readiness of
transracial adoptive parents to anticipate and address issues relating to race
is an important factor in ensuring that success.' 3 ' At a minimum, then,
some specialized inquiry into the preparedness of transracial adoptive
parents seems justifiable. Beyond that, considerations of race in child
placement must depend upon empirical proof that, for a particular child,
the benefits of preferring a same-race placement would be sufficiently
significant to justify the social costs of race-conscious decisionmaking.
While the available evidence suggests this will not be often, it remains
incomplete and recognizes-as should the Constitution-that the
circumstances and needs of some individual children are exceptional.

131. See Whitten, supra note 112, at 497.
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